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PROVIDING PROPER PREPARATION:  
ACHIEVING ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
FOR FOSTER YOUTH 
 
 
FARRAH CHAMPAGNE1 
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION  
 
When Sherry T.2 was 14 years old, the police removed her from her 
mother’s home.  Sherry was in tenth grade at the time, and as a result of her 
displacement she dropped out of high school.  Over the next year and a 
half, she slept outside, in abandoned homes, and in the homes of strangers.  
She had no money and no food, and did what she had to do in order to 
survive.  One winter night, she was alone and had nowhere to go.  She 
became so desperate that she caused a ruckus at a shopping center and 
purposely got arrested just so she would have a warm place to sleep that 
night.  At the time, she did not care whether the police locked her up 
indefinitely because at least she would have food to eat, a place to sleep, 
and clothes to wear.   
The next morning, she was taken to a homeless shelter where she 
enrolled in an alternative school.  The conditions were so rough at the 
school that she quit after about two weeks, and decided to take the General 
Educational Development Test (G.E.D).  At the time, she was just fifteen 
and a half years old.  After obtaining her G.E.D., she enrolled in the 
cosmetology school that was down the street from the transitional 
                                                
1 Executive Editor, Labor and Employment Law Forum, Volume 4.1; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2014, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., 
Broadcast Journalism, 2007, University of Maryland, College Park.  I want to 
especially thank Professor Susan Bennett for her mentorship, guidance, and invaluable 
feedback.  It was an honor and a privilege to work with you. I am grateful to the editors 
and staff of the Labor and Employment Law Forum for their thoughtful suggestions.  I 
am especially grateful to my mother, father, grandmother, and grandfather for your 
encouragement and interest in my work.  Most of all, I would like to thank my 
husband, Maurice, who has been extremely patient, understanding, supportive, and 
loving throughout our relationship. 
2 This is not her real name; it has been changed for privacy purposes. 
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placement she had been moved to. While she was living in the transitional 
placement, she received very little guidance from the staff members about 
how to budget, pay bills, or maintain steady employment, and soon after 
her eighteenth birthday she was forced to move out.  She had an extremely 
difficult time even though she had a job because she did not know how to 
maintain her housing or employment.  After about six months, her landlord 
told her that she would have to move because she could not pay the rent.  
Since she did not have enough money saved to get an apartment she 
became homeless again.   
Sherry’s story is not uncommon. Many foster youth receive little to no 
instruction about how to survive in the adult world, and as a result many of 
them face a losing battle and become homeless adults.3 It is unreasonable to 
expect youths to attain perfect independence at age eighteen, when the 
average age of independence in America is twenty-six years of age.4  This 
Comment argues that foster youths have a substantive due process right to 
receive emancipation preparation services designed to prepare them for 
independent living and to prevent future homelessness.   
This paper consists of nine parts.  In Part II, I provide an overview of a 
foster youth’s life after aging out of the foster care system.  Part II argues 
that serious problems occur in the lives of foster youth because they often 
leave care without having been provided, by their state appointed 
caregivers, the necessary resources to enable them to succeed. In Part III, I 
argue that courts should establish a ‘right to treatment’ for foster youth.  
Part III also argues that the state is responsible for offering foster youth 
emancipation preparation services and should be held liable if they fail to 
do so.  In Part IV, I outline the substantive due process rights afforded to 
foster youth.  In Part V, I compare the standard of deliberate indifference to 
the standard of professional judgment when establishing liability under 
Section 1983 for a violation of a foster youth’s substantive due process 
rights.  In Part V, I argue that the professional judgment standard is more 
appropriate then the deliberate indifference standard as applied in the foster 
care context. In Part VI, I highlight the dangers of distinguishing between 
voluntarily and involuntarily placed foster children as they relate to 
standards of protection from harm in the eyes of the court.  In Part VII, I 
explain three litigation strategies that foster youth can utilize when bringing 
causes of action against state actors. Finally, in Part VIII, I provide 
                                                
3 See Miriam Aroni Krinsky, A Not So Happy Birthday: The Foster Youth Transition 
from Adolescence into Adulthood, 48 Fam. Ct. Rev. 250 (2010)(explaining that former 
foster youth are expected to become fully self-sufficient by the age of eighteen 
although the average age of financial independence in the U.S. is twenty-six). 
4 Id. (claiming that when foster youth falter, there is no one there to support them). 
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recommendations that can be implemented by legislative bodies to better 
serve the career and personal development needs of foster youth.  
 
PART II: THE PERILS OF UNPREPARED EMANCIPATION  
There are five major reasons that youth become involved in the foster 
care system: neglect or abuse, mental illness in the parent, the child’s 
emotional issues, illness or incapacity of the parent, and family problems.5  
There are four types of placements for foster youth: basic foster care, 
therapeutic foster care, institutional care or residential treatment, and 
psychiatric hospitalization.6   Instead of going into a traditional placement, 
some youth may choose to move in with a relative.  Nevertheless, the 
caregivers at shelters and foster homes often provide foster youth with 
basic necessities such as food, clothing, and a bed, but they rarely provide 
the youth with the necessary tools and strategies for adult living.7  Once the 
children reach the age of eighteen, they “age out” of the system and are 
expected to provide for all of their needs including, rent, food, 
transportation, clothing, and other living expenses.8   
According to the United States Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and 
Reporting System (AFCARS) there were 400,540 children in foster care on 
September 30, 2011.9  AFCARS also reported that 245,260 children exited 
foster care during fiscal year 2011, and 26,286 were emancipated that 
year.10  Many of these youth do not have parents who will offer the support 
they need to maintain their housing, thus they often become homeless or 
resort to self-destructive means of survival.  
                                                
5 See Mary Ann Davis, The Development of Persistent Criminality, 233 (Joanne 
Savage eds., 2009)(explaining that vulnerable foster youth sometimes need to be place 
out of their homes as a means of protection from their family or caretakers). 
6 Id. 
7 See May Shin, A Saving Grace? The Impact of the Fostering Connections to 
Success and Increasing Adoptions Act on America's Older Foster Youth, 9 Hastings 
Race & Poverty L. J. 133, 134 (2012)(stating that most children who leave the foster 
care system are not well prepared to live independently). 
8 See Davis, supra note 4, at 233 (stating that non-foster care youth in the United 
States are dependent through college).. 
9 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Admin. for Child. & Fams., Admin. on 
Child., Youth & Fams., Child. Bureau, The AFCARS Report, Preliminary FY 2011 
Estimates as of June 2012, Rep. 19 (2012) [hereinafter AFCARS Report 19], available 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/main/afcarsreport19.pdf. 
10 Id. 
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Foster youth face significant challenges in their quest to obtain gainful 
employment when they emancipate from the foster care system. These 
problems occur because the youth often leave foster care without the 
necessary resources and skills to enable them to be productive in society.11  
The high unemployment rates among foster youth are compounded by 
problems faced when they attempt to gain adequate education and 
independent living skills.12 For example, the average seventeen-year old 
foster youth reads at a seventh grade level, making it very likely that she 
will not graduate from high school.13  This lack of education can lead to 
homelessness shortly after aging out of the foster care system. In fact, 
many emancipated foster youth who have not received adequate 
emancipation preparation services turn to prostitution, drug dealing, and 
crimes of desperation just to survive.14 
 
A. High Unemployment Rates 
Many youth who emancipate from the foster care system find themselves 
unable to perform as productive members of society because they often 
lack the necessary skills, experience, knowledge and support systems.15 
Without this support, foster youth face enormous economic challenges.  
The main step toward economic self-sufficiency is obtaining a stable form 
of employment.16  Not only do former foster youth have to obtain and 
retain employment, they also need to pay a security deposit for an 
apartment, have good credit, obtain furniture, and pay monthly rent.  It is 
not surprising then that many of the eighteen year olds who have been 
forced into emancipation by the foster care system often lack stable 
incomes and housing.17  Statistics show that former foster care youth fair 
                                                
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Katherine M. Swift, A Child's Right: What Should the State Be Required to 
Provide to Teenagers Aging Out of Foster Care? 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1205, 
1207 (2007) (citing Mark E. Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult 
Functioning of Former Foster Youth: Conditions of Youth Preparing to Leave State 
Care (2004)). 
14 See Kevin M. Ryan, Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: a Due Process 
Perspective, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 271, 276 - 277 (1993)(stating that many runaways 
“succumb to a life of chronic indigence, ensnared by long-term homelessness and 
poverty”). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See e.g. Allison Henig, Employment Aid for Youth Aging Out of Foster Care: 
Extending One-Stop Career Centers to Include A Division for Foster Care Youth, 47 
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poorly after emancipation in the realm of employment.18 In addition, youth 
who are unemployed tend to lack the necessary skills to develop an 
employment track record, which can lead to them earning a lower living 
wage over their working lives.19 A high rate of unemployment in former 
foster youth negatively affects communities and economic prosperity.20   
Foster youth who obtain employment often receive low wages, leaving 
them below the federal poverty level.21 As a result, many rely on public 
assistance to meet their needs, which is not a cure for the long-term 
problem.22  If foster youth learn how to become self-sufficient, there would 
not be as much of a need for government assistance.23  A national survey 
revealed that only 38% of former foster youth were employed for one year 
after leaving the foster care system.24 This survey needs to be viewed by 
comparing societal norms in the United States where our society does not 
expect youth to be fully independent at the age of eighteen.25 For example, 
the United States Census Bureau found that in 2011, 29,641,000 youth who 
                                                
Fam. Ct. Rev. 570, 572 (2009)(concluding that many youth do not have the knowledge, 
experience, habits, and relationships that will provide the necessary support for them to 
be productive members of society). 
18 See Scott Hollander, Jonathan Budd, William A. Petulla, Jennifer A. Staley, 
Helping Clients Transition to Independent Living, 45 Fam. Ct. Rev. 444 (2007); see 
also Child Welfare League of America, Child Welfare: Youth After Foster Care, 
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/fostercare/factsheetafter.htm (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2013). 
19 See Dorcas R. Gilmore, Youth Entrepreneurship Legal Services: A Model for 
Helping Youths Create Their Own Jobs, 43 Clearinghouse Rev. J. of Poverty L. & 
Pol'y 37 (May-June 2009)(claiming that youth unemployment negatively affects 
society as a whole). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See Susan Bennett, Heartbreak Hotel: The Disharmonious Convergence of 
Welfare, Housing and Homelessness, 1 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 27, 34 (1990) 
(claiming that welfare benefits are a short-term fix for a long-term problem that cannot 
be simply cured with emergency funding). 
23 See id. 
24 Child Welfare League of America, Child Welfare: Youth After Foster Care, 
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/fostercare/factsheetafter.htm (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2013). 
25 U.S. Census, Current Population Survey, Young Adults Living At Home: 1960 to 
Present, tbl. AD-1 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-
fam/ad1.xls.   
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were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four were living in 
households with older adults rather than independently; 58.9% of the males 
and 50.2% of the females were living with their parents.26  The failure of 
our society to recognize the economic difficulties facing former foster 
youth and provide them with proper preparation for emancipation may be 
part of the cause of the difficulty that foster youth face when they age out 
of foster care. 
 
B. Low Educational Achievement 
The concept of what constitutes a level of education necessary for 
success in today’s competitive world has changed.  At one time a high 
school diploma was enough to guarantee a person’s success as an adult, but 
today it is necessary to obtain some form of post-secondary education.  The 
more education a person obtains, the more financial stability she has.27  
Workers today have few job prospects if they only have a high school 
diploma, and as necessary education levels rise, those who do not keep 
pace will be left behind. Foster teens are at especially high risk because 
they cannot depend on family members to support them financially if they 
cannot obtain employment.  In order for a former foster youth to gain 
employment, she must have academic skills; unfortunately fewer than half 
of former foster youth have graduated from high school.28    
This low educational achievement can partly be attributed to the 
relocation that happens when youth are placed in foster care. Youth who 
are placed out of their homes are often deprived of the permanence that 
would assist them in completing their education. This leads to low 
graduation rates and places former foster youth at a distinct disadvantage 
when it comes to employment possibilities.29  The inability to compete with 
job candidates who have high school diplomas and college degrees leaves 
many former foster youth out on a limb when it comes to maintaining fully 
functional independent living. 
                                                
26 Id. 
27 See Michele M. Benedetto, The Key to Successful Independence: State-Funded 
Post-Secondary Educational Assistance for Emancipated Foster Youth, 23 St. John's J. 
Legal Comment. 383, 392 (2008)(stating that two people in a household who earn 
minimum wage make far less yearly income than the current median, and that those 
low wages make it nearly impossible to maintain financial independence).. 
28 See Shin, supra note 7, at 139(claiming that low high school graduation rates work 
against former foster youth, especially when they attempt to compete for jobs against 
high school and college graduates). 
29 See id.(claiming that high unemployment rates are worsened by the challenges 
foster youth face when they attempt to gain education and necessary life skills). 
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The government has a duty to protect foster youth from harm when they 
are in the state’s custody and this includes properly preparing them for 
adulthood.30  The state’s responsibility to provide emancipation preparation 
services should include offering foster youth post-secondary educational 
opportunities. To become fully functioning productive members of society, 
foster youth must have access to institutions of higher education or 
vocational programs. This includes state provisions of necessary financial 
resources. 
It is recognized that housing is essential for independent living, but 
without the means to pay rent, there will be no housing.  Foster youth need 
job skills, and in order to gain job skills, they need education. The problem, 
however, is that higher education is expensive and former foster youth are 
unlikely to have the resources to be able to afford college or a vocational 
training program. Since foster youth cannot count on the support of family 
members, they should be able to obtain funding from the state, which has 
been appointed to serve as a parental figure. Foster youth would develop 
positively if states would strongly support their educational needs. 
 
C. Poverty 
Low-wage jobs can lead to poverty; poverty can lead to homelessness.  
Foster youth do not have a financial support network, unlike the many who 
have never lived in the foster care system.31  Studies show that within a 
two-year period, 40-50% of former foster youth become homeless.32  There 
is a strong correlation between foster care and homelessness; a national 
survey reported that 25% of former foster youth became homeless for at 
least one night within four years of emancipation.33  According to another 
study, 27% of the adult homeless population in New York and Los Angeles 
were former foster care youth.34  In California, as of April 2011, there were 
more homeless former foster children than war veterans in the state’s 
                                                
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 141. 
32 Chapter VI: Life after Foster Care, Juvenile Justice in California Part II: 
Dependency System, League of Women Voters of Cal. (July 1998), available at 
http://www.ca.lwv.org/jjds/chap6.html (stating that the respondents in his study were 
not able to buy food or pay bills). 
33 Child Welfare League of America, Child Welfare: Youth After Foster Care, 
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/fostercare/factsheetafter.htm (last visited 
April 13, 2013)(stating that three in ten homeless adults report that they were former 
foster care youth). 
34 Id. (showing that seventy percent of former foster youth wanted to attend college). 
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homeless shelters.35  Many of these youth became homeless when they 
“aged out” of the foster care system at the tender age of eighteen. 
It is unrealistic to expect youth who have suffered from abuse and 
neglect to have workable independent living skills at the age of eighteen.36  
Independent living skills assist youth in achieving and maintaining 
economic self-sufficiency, but these skills are not enough to ensure 
successful emancipation.37  Along with independent living skills, former 
foster youth need support networks and relationships with family, friends, 
colleagues, and other adults.  Interdependence is what is necessary, and this 
combination of skills and support networks is what leads to high quality 
independent living.38  Achieving workable interdependency requires 
planning for emancipation by assessing and acquiring networks for 
potential resources including relatives, mentors, members of religious 
organizations, and foster parents.39  Foster youth need others who can help 
them advance economically.40  
Very few of us would allow our eighteen-year-old child to move out of 
our home with no job, no money, no home, and no life skills.  Many of us 
on the other hand would assist her when the inevitable difficulties of life 
fell upon her.  Yet former foster youth who have often suffered abuse and 
neglect are abandoned and left to face the harsh realities of adult life 
without any help.41  Former foster youth on average earn $6,000 or less per 
                                                
35 Amita Sharma, Many Penniless Foster Kids Call the Streets Home (KPBS 
Evening Edition radio broadcast Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/apr/06/many-penniless-former-foster-kids-make-call-
street/(claiming that “reform requires influence” and there are very few lobbyists in 
Sacramento who advocate for foster youth, thus many of them fall through the cracks). 
36 UCLA Sch. of Soc. Welfare Ctr. for Child and Family Policy Studies, AGING 
OUT OF FOSTER CARE: L.A. County’s Indep. Living Program, Final Report Year 1, 
Rep. 3, 22 (1988)(arguing that the notion of independent living for eighteen-year olds 
is unrealistic). 
37 Id (stating that the notion of independent eighteen-year olds is unrealistic, 
especially for children who have been victims of abuse or neglect or who have spent 
time in foster care). 
38 Id. at 23(asserting that concrete skill-building can help achieve interdependence). 
39 Id. (arguing that the focus should be on interdependence rather than 
independence). 
40 See Susan D. Bennett, Creating A Client Consortium: Building Social Capital, 
Bridging Structural Holes, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 67, 101 (2006) (asserting that 
community clients need to build connections within their communities in order to 
advance economically and socially). 
41 See Krinsky, supra note 3, at 251.   
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year; they lack independent living skills; only one-third have driver’s 
licenses; fewer than half have $250 in cash; and fewer than a fourth of 
them have the skills to set up and maintain a household.42 When society 
fails to properly prepare foster youth for emancipation, it creates tragedies 
in the lives of the youth who then are more likely to become homeless soon 
after leaving the foster care system. With just a smattering of knowledge 
about life in the real world, many former foster youth find themselves alone 
at the tender age of eighteen, desperate for survival.   
 
D. Crimes of Desperation 
Foster youth are more likely to engage in criminal activity than youth 
who were not involved in the system.43  When foster youth “age out” of the 
system they are at a high risk of becoming involved with crime.44  Studies 
show that foster youth were more likely to report that they damaged 
property, stole something that was worth more than $50, participated in a 
group fight, and pulled a knife or a gun on someone.45  This high rate of 
criminal behavior is of particular concern because of the negative 
                                                
42 See Jose-Luis Mejia, Glenn Eagleson & Justin Slaughter, Honoring Emancipated 
Youth, Barriers Facing Foster Youth: National and Local Statistics Around 
Emancipating Foster Youth, 
http://yesyous.com/static/files/0266e33d3f546cb5436a10798e657d97/1335227502/Fost
erYouthStatistics.pdf (last visited April 13, 2013); see also Peter J. Pecora et al., 
Improving Family Foster Care: Findings From the Northwest Foster Care Alumni 
Study (2005), available at 
http://www.casey.org/Resources/Publications/pdf/ImprovingFamilyFosterCare_FR.pdf. 
(last visited April 13, 2013);  see also Robert M. George et al., University of Chicago, 
Chapin Hall Center for Children, Employment Outcomes for Youth Aging Out of 
Foster Care (2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/fostercare-agingout02 (last 
visited April 13, 2013). 
43 See Shin, supra note 7, at 141(asserting that foster youth are incarcerated more 
often because “judges perceive their lack of caregiver representation as an indication 
that the youth[s] are less stable and less supervised than their non-foster peers.”). 
44 Id. (stating that one in four foster youth who age out of foster care will be 
incarcerated within the first two years of emancipation. 
45 Offending During Late Adolescence: How Do Youth Aging Out Of Care Compare 
With Their Peers? Chapin Hall 1, 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/publications/ChapinHallDocument_0.pdf 
(last visited April 13, 2013). 
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correlation between criminal history and obtainment of employment.46  
Studies show that people who were formerly incarcerated work less and 
earn less than those who were not incarcerated.47  Even when foster youths 
obtain employment, they often have difficulty retaining the job.  Thus, they 
often elect to earn a considerable amount of their income from outside of 
the legal economy.48 One study showed that former foster youth sometimes 
resort to illegal means in order to support themselves, including drug 
dealing and prostitution.49 
Youth who become homeless or who are at risk of becoming homeless 
sometimes engage in survival sex, which is the “selling of sex to meet 
subsistence needs.”50  Homeless boys and girls constitute the highest 
represented population of prostitutes, engaging in survival sex to get 
shelter, food, drugs, or money.51  This results in an extremely high rate of 
HIV infections.52 Survival sex is a strategy that is used to maintain 
economic stability and is often combined with other high-risk behaviors 
including “substance use, suicide attempts, STDs, pregnancies and criminal 
behavior.”53  According to a recent study, about 28% of street youth and 
10% of shelter youth reported that they had engaged in survival sex.  The 
authors of the study say that it is likely that the subjects “underreported 
their participation in survival sex, a highly stigmatized behavior.”54 The 
                                                
46 Michael G. Vaughn, Aging Out of Foster Care and Legal Involvement: Toward a 
Typology of Risk, 82 Soc. Serv. Rev. 422, Univ. of Chi. Press (2008) (asserting that 
individuals who were incarcerated in their late teens usually work less and are less 
likely to get married than those who were not incarcerated).   
47 Id. 
48 See John Hagan & Bill McCarthy, On Your Own Without A Net: The Transition 
To Adulthood For Vulnerable Populations, 182 (D. Wayne Osgood et al. eds., 2005) 
(stating that many homeless youth are arrested for requesting spare change or for 
cleaning vehicle windows for money). 
49 Chapter VI: Life After Foster Care, Juvenile Justice in California Part II: 
Dependency System, League of Women Voters of Cal. (July 1998), available at 
http://www.ca.lwv.org/jjds/chap6.html. 
50 Jody M. Greene et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Survival Sex Among 
Runaway and Homeless Youth, Am. J. of Pub. Health, 1406, 1406-08 (1999), available 
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1508758/pdf/amjph00009-0102.pdf   
(last visited November 22, 2013). 
51 Id.  
52 See Ryan, supra note 14, at 277. 
53 See Greene, supra note 50, at 1406-08. 
54 Id.at 1408. 
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proportion of homeless and runaway youth who practice survival sex 
ranges from 10% to 50%.55   
Youth who are not properly prepared for independent living either 
become homeless or are at risk of becoming homeless, so they seek others 
who are in similar situations.  This can lead to gang involvement, which 
can lead to incarceration.56  Some girls who do not have the support of 
family members join gangs and earn their keep by servicing the dominant 
males in the gang with sex, thus contributing to the “gang economy.”57  
Disadvantaged former foster youth who are ill prepared for adult living 
may feel as though they have no choice but to turn to gang affiliation in 
order to survive. Youths in gangs are often involved in drug trafficking.58  
For many former foster youth, dealing drugs is a means of survival.   
Without proper preparation for emancipation, many former foster youth 
feel as though they have no other choice but to deal drugs in order to 
maintain their economic stability.59  Studies show that negative outcomes 
such as these are positively correlated with the lack of stability that many 
youth experience in foster care situations.60  Independent living programs, 
drop-in centers, and outreach programs may help youth find employment 
and long-term housing to prevent some of these destructive survival 
mechanisms.61 
 
PART III: THE ‘RIGHT TO TREATMENT’ FOR FOSTER YOUTH 
Foster youth who age out of the foster care system should have the right 
to receive services for the maintenance of successful independent living. 
The failure to provide these services is extremely harmful. This harm does 
not necessarily show while the youth is in care; it manifests once the youth 
                                                
55 Id.at 1406. 
56 Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth's Substantive Due 
Process Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL'Y 381, 389 (2005). 
57 See Greene, supra note 50, at 1407. 
58 Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry 
v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 309 (2010). 
59 Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive 
Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 157-58 (2003). 
60 Melinda Atkinson, Aging Out of Foster Care: Towards A Universal Safety Net for 
Former Foster Care Youth, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 190 (2008). 
61 See Greene, supra note 50, 1409. 
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has left foster care and is living independently. In order to prevent this 
harm, courts should establish a ‘right to treatment’ for foster youth.   
 
A. The History of ‘Right to Treatment’ Theories 
Advocates in the mental health field brought national attention to the 
‘right to treatment.’62  Morton Birnbaum advocated for the concept by 
arguing that people who were institutionalized under parens patriae must 
receive “adequate medical and psychological treatment.”63 Birnbaum 
argued that with a ‘right to treatment’ legislatures would have to provide 
appropriate facilities for people in mental institutions.64 The ‘right to 
treatment’ can be based on the Constitution or on statute.  In Miller v. 
Overholser, the court considered the ‘right to treatment’ from a statutory 
perspective as it related to the condition for which Miller needed 
treatment.65  The court in that case held that a person who is incarcerated 
for treatment as a sexual psychopath and had not committed a criminal act, 
had a right to receive therapeutic treatment related to the reason for his 
commitment.66 
If no statutory ‘right to treatment’ existed, the institutionalized person 
had to look to the Constitution.  The support for the ‘right to treatment’ in 
the Constitution was pronounced in Rouse v. Cameron.   In that 1966 case, 
the court explained that the purpose of committing people involuntarily to a 
mental hospital was to treat them for the mental condition that led to the 
commitment.67  Without that treatment, the court said that the hospital 
would effectively be transformed into a penitentiary where people could be 
held indefinitely even though they committed no criminal offense.68  The 
court found that failing to provide treatment could violate the confined 
person’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.69  The court 
explained that confinement without treatment for someone who committed 
no crime could be considered so “inhumane as to be cruel and unusual 
punishment,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.70   
                                                
62 Mark H. Marshall, The Right to Treatment for Juveniles in Texas: A Legislative 
Proposal, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 142, 145 (1981) (citing Morton Birnbaum, The Right to 
Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 499-505 (1960)). 
63 See id. 
64 Id. 
65 Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
66 Id. at 419. 
67 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
68 Id.at 453. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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Since this decision, the ‘right to treatment’ has gained a measure of 
acceptance in lower federal courts.71  Those courts have held that 
involuntarily committed individuals have the right to receive rehabilitative 
treatment under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
possibly under the Eighth Amendment.72  In Wyatt v. Stickney, the court 
held that patients involuntarily committed to mental institutions for 
treatment purposes “unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive 
such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity 
to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition.”73   
 
B. The Expansion of the ‘Right to Treatment’ 
The idea of a ‘right to treatment’ for juvenile offenders came about in the 
late nineteenth century.  Those were the early days of the juvenile court 
movement where progressive reformers envisioned a juvenile correction 
system that would provide youth with individualized treatment in a 
separate facility from adults.74  Applying the doctrine of parens patriae, 
juvenile courts emphasized rehabilitation, supervision, and treatment rather 
than punishment.  Juvenile hearings were confidential, and children were 
deemed delinquent rather than guilty of a crime.75  Juries and lawyers were 
not allowed in the proceedings, and dispositions were made by determining 
the best interest of the child, with a focus on the character and lifestyle of 
that particular child.76  
  Formal rules were replaced with principles of psychology, and courts 
would collect personal information about each child in order to analyze, 
diagnose, and cure them.77  In his dissent in K.H. v. Morgan, Judge Coffey 
affirmed his support for the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice 
system. He cited Nelson v. Heyne’s holding that juveniles who were 
removed from their parent’s custody and placed in state custody must be 
given “appropriate individualized care and treatment.”78  Coffey expanded 
this view of individualized care and treatment by quoting the Nelson court:  
                                                
71 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
72 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) aff'd sub nom. Wyatt 
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
73 Stickney, 325 F. Supp. At 784.  
74 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, 
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 821, 823-825 (1988). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 855 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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In our view the ‘right to treatment’ includes the right to minimum 
acceptable standards of care and treatment for juveniles and the 
right to individualized care and treatment. Because children differ 
in their need for rehabilitation, individual need for treatment will 
differ. When a state assumes the place of the juvenile's parents, it 
assumes as well the parental duties, and its treatment of its 
juveniles should, so far as can be reasonably required, be what 
proper parental care would provide.79  
The courts recognized that children had different needs based on their 
history, environment, and character.  Thus, the courts remained flexible 
when diagnosing and treating children. This enhanced flexibility meant 
fewer legal procedures and more leeway with treatment options.  This 
leeway required little accountability, and as a result, many unfortunate 
occurrences ensued in the lives of the children who were supposed to be 
receiving rehabilitation.  Instead of receiving ‘appropriate individualized 
care and treatment,’80 juveniles received harsh orders of confinement, 
which resembled strict penal sentences.  The inappropriate treatment 
prompted lawyers and scholars to attack the juvenile court system and the 
institutional school system where children were being sent for treatment.81    
The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault transformed the juvenile 
court to one that was strikingly similar to the adult court. In Gault, a 
fifteen-year old boy was arrested for violating an Arizona law when he 
used foul language over the telephone.82   At an informal hearing he was 
‘sentenced’ to confinement in Arizona’s Industrial School for six years.83 
His parents filed a petition for his release claiming that their son’s due 
process rights were violated.84  The court concluded that a juvenile court 
hearing must “measure up to the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment.”85  In an effort to combine rehabilitation with the emerging 
constitutional doctrines, lawyers developed a constitutionally based ‘right 
to treatment’ that would apply to juveniles deemed delinquent.   
 
 
                                                
79 Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974) (italics added). 
80 Morgan, 914 F.2d at 855. 
81 Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever Happened to the Right to 
Treatment?: The Modern Quest for A Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1796 
(1995). 
82 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4, 60 (1967). 
83 Id.at 60-61. 
84 Id. at 3. 
85 Id. at 30. 
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C. A Description of the Constitutional Theories 
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides two bases for 
the ‘right to treatment.’  The first is referred to as the quid pro quo theory, 
which was endorsed in Morales, Nelson, and Sproat.86  This theory requires 
state actors to provide appropriate treatment in relation to the purpose of a 
person’s confinement.87  For example, if someone is hospitalized for a 
particular illness, treatment for that specific illness is required.88  If the 
person is not treated for the purpose of his hospitalization, it is equivalent 
to being locked up in a penitentiary without having committed a criminal 
offense.89 The second Fourteenth Amendment argument is referred to as 
the Purpose Theory.  The requirement of this theory is reflected in Jackson 
v. Indiana, a United States Supreme Court case.  In that case, the Court 
held that in order for states to justify restricting a person’s liberty, treatment 
must be provided such that it “bear[s] some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed.”90  If no treatment is 
provided, and the youth has been confined for purposes other than 
punishment, the confinement would constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.91  
The courts differ in the ways in which they embrace the constitutional 
argument of a ‘right to treatment.’  Courts can apply one of the theories or 
they can combine them.  In Morgan v. Sproat, the court embraced both the 
quid pro quo and the purpose arguments.  There the court explained that 
the purpose of incarcerating juveniles in a training school was for 
treatment, and due process required that the programs at the school be 
related to that purpose.92  The court also referred to the parens patriae 
                                                
86 See Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (stating that 
denial of due process safeguards is constitutionally impermissible unless the 
“incarceration of juveniles serves beneficent rather than punitive, purposes”); Morales 
v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (asserting that the government must 
afford quid pro quo for eliminating procedural safeguards when confining juveniles 
only for rehabilitation), rev'd on procedural grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), 
aff'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (per curiam); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 458 (N.D. 
Ind. 1972) (affirming that juveniles are entitled to constitutionally protected procedural 
safeguards), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352, 359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).   
87 Gary W. v. State of La., 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
91 Id. 
92 Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977). 
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doctrine and explained that the juvenile must be given treatment so that the 
involuntary commitment did not amount to an “arbitrary exercise of 
governmental power proscribed by the due process clause.”93 
The plaintiffs in the above cases requested extensive relief.  The 
plaintiffs’ testimonies about the dangerous facilities and lack of treatment 
shocked the judges so much that they issued comprehensive corrective 
rulings.94  The courts enjoined inadequate treatment programs, necessitated 
student progress reports, and required instruction for corrections officers 
about how to provide treatment.95   
The ‘right to treatment’ was a powerful claim employed to improve 
juvenile facilities until the early 1980’s Supreme Court decision in 
Youngberg v. Romeo.  This case limited the ‘right to treatment’ for 
incarcerated juveniles.  In that case, Romeo claimed that he had a right to 
safety, freedom from restraint, and minimally adequate training.  The Court 
granted his first two claims in non-absolute terms,96 and found his third 
claim troubling.97  The court ruled narrowly on the third issue asserting that 
the State has no constitutional duty to provide substantive services to 
people in its care.98 The Court reasoned that no amount of training would 
permit his release from the institution and consequently limited his training 
to coincide with his need for safety and freedom from bodily restraint.99  
 
                                                
93 Id. 
94 See e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354 n.3, 356-57 (7th Cir.) (explaining 
that staff regularly tranquilized the juveniles and beat them with a thick wooden paddle, 
which caused bleeding, blistering, and bruising), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); 
Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1138 (stating that juveniles were placed in cells that had “no 
window, furnishings or slab for sleeping,” and the toilet was a “hole in the floor with a 
flushing mechanism located outside the cell”); Martarella v. Kelly, 359 F. Supp. 478, 
480 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that the facility had unusable plumbing, roof leaks, and 
cracked walls and ceilings); Inmates of Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 
1354, 1359-60 (D.R.I. 1972) (stating that juveniles did not have ready access to 
medical care and were never allowed outdoor exercise). 
95 Morgan, 432 F. Supp. At 1148 (enjoining defendant from continuing to operate 
inadequate treatment program and ordering defendant to submit a plan outlining 
student’s progress); Martarella, 359 F. Supp. at 483 (finding that the court has the 
authority to determine which standards of care must be met for cases involving 
institutional inmates); Inmates of Boys' Training Sch., 346 F. Supp. at 1374.  
96 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319–20 (1982). 
97 Id. at 316. 
98 Id. at 317. 
99 Id. at 317–318. 
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D. Applying the ‘Right to Treatment’ to Foster Youth under Youngberg 
Although Youngberg100 limited the ‘right to treatment’ for individuals in 
institutions, the right, albeit a narrow one, can be applied effectively to 
assist foster youth who are reaching the age of emancipation.  The Court’s 
holding in Youngberg guaranteed institutionalized people the right to 
training for safety and freedom from bodily restraint.101  This right could be 
extended to foster youth preparing for emancipation.  Foster youth who are 
preparing to emancipate from state custody need training to ensure their 
personal safety and bodily freedom in the adult world.  Necessary training 
that should be required for foster youth as it concerns their safety and 
freedom when they are emancipating from foster care includes instruction 
regarding (1) life skills, (2) housing maintenance, (3) budgeting, (4) 
obtaining and maintaining employment, (5) obtaining medical coverage, 
and (6) securing community resources and permanent networks.  
Without this essential preparation for adulthood from the state actors 
responsible for their care, foster youth suffer tremendous harm.  Some of 
the harms suffered include adult homelessness, unemployment, low 
educational achievement, and crimes of desperation. Crimes of desperation 
often lead people into situations that compromise their “safety,” which can 
also lead to the “bodily restraint” and loss of freedom that comes from 
being locked up in a jail cell.  These situations are harmful and preventable 
if the state actors who are responsible for the care of foster youth would 
provide them with necessary tools for economic self-sufficiency. 
The similarities between Romeo’s situation and the plight of foster care 
youth are striking.  The Supreme Court stated in Youngberg: 
It is not feasible . . . to define or identify the type of training that 
may be required in every case. A court properly may start with the 
generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. 
The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar to 
courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable in light of 
identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.102  
A foster youth who is leaving state custody has a liberty interest in safety 
and freedom similar to the way that Romeo in Youngberg did.  At least one 
court has recognized the connection between Romeo and foster youth.  In 
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, the Second Circuit extended the reasoning in 
                                                
100 Id. at 317. 
101 Id. at 319. 
102 Id. n.25. 
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Youngberg to children in foster care.103  The court in that case agreed with 
the court in Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, that 
“[w]hen individuals are placed in custody or under the care of the 
government, their governmental custodians are sometimes charged with 
affirmative duties, the nonfeasance of which may violate the 
constitution.”104  The Marisol court held that the children stated a sufficient 
Fourteenth Amendment claim for the “defendants’ failure to provide 
reasonable services and placements that protect [the foster children’s] right 
of association with their biological family members.”105 
 
E. Teenagers in Foster Care Should Have a ‘Right to Treatment’ 
Teenagers may have acquired the necessary skills to avoid physical harm 
while they are in foster care, but they need special training in order to avoid 
harm after they emancipate from the system.106  Documents sent to 
Congress indicate that foster youth who age out of the system experience 
“high rates of homelessness, non-marital childbearing, poverty, and 
delinquent or criminal behavior; they are also frequently the target of crime 
and physical assaults.”107  The Foster Care Independence Act recommends 
that state and local governments offer extensive financial assistance, and 
programs for education, training, and employment to foster youth who are 
preparing for emancipation.108  
When teenagers emancipate from the foster care system, they often lose 
contact with their state-appointed caregivers.  Keeping track of youth after 
they emancipate would require an inordinate amount of time, money, and 
effort.  This fact necessitates that state actors provide foster youth with 
workable life skills so they can succeed in adulthood.  When foster youth 
succeed after emancipation, society benefits.  Training for adulthood could 
help former foster youth stay off public assistance and out of prison or 
other state-sponsored institutions.  Instead of turning to crime for economic 
support, emancipated foster youth will be more likely to get a legal job, go 
to college, and be productive members of society. 
                                                
103 Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F.Supp. 662, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd sub nom., 
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997). 
104 Doe v. New York City Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981). 
105 Marisol A. by Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) aff'd sub 
nom. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997). 
106 See Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, § 101, 113 Stat. 
1822, 1823 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 677).  
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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Some may argue that extending the ‘right to treatment’ to foster youth 
would bring about more financial constraints and disincentivize social 
workers from removing children from dangerous situations. The problem, 
however, does not lie in the extra responsibility that comes from parenting 
the youth.  The court in K.H. asserted that the problem lies in the limited 
supply of financial resources in the child welfare system. 109  The lack of 
financial resources may provide some insight into why courts do not 
recognize the affirmative right of treatment for foster youth, but do 
recognize a right for freedom from harm. Providing services can be 
extremely costly; refraining from harm is free. 
 
PART IV: THE EVOLUTION OF FOSTER YOUTH’S SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS RIGHT OF FREEDOM FROM HARM 
Foster youth who age out of the foster care system face serious 
difficulties and States should provide services for these youth so they can 
become self-sufficient adults. When a youth is in foster care, the state 
assumes a parental role.  The state actors should be required by law to 
protect foster children from harm by providing treatment in the form of 
services to prepare the youth for adulthood. These services should include 
the provision of access to support systems and educational and employment 
opportunities so that foster youth can acquire the tools they need to succeed 
in their transition to independent living. 
 
A. The Right to Be Free From Harm in Prisons and Mental 
Health Facilities 
In DeShaney v. Winnebego County Department of Social Services, the 
Court analogized the rights of abused and neglected children to the rights 
of prisoners and mentally retarded persons.110  The Supreme Court initially 
recognized that prisoners had a right to humane conditions and adequate 
medical treatment in Estelle v. Gamble.111  Later, the Supreme Court in 
Youngberg v. Romeo recognized that mental health patients have a right to 
freedom from harm.112  These two cases serve as the foundation for the 
constitutional right to safety while in state custody.  Under Section 1983, 
                                                
109 See K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1990). 
110 Id. 
111 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
112 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). 
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this right can be used to enforce an affirmative duty on state actors to 
ensure that those who are in state custody are safe from harm.113 
  
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court stated that prisoners are entitled 
to medical care under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
punishment clause.114  The plaintiff, a prisoner, had serious medical 
problems including a back injury.  When he asked to see a doctor, prison 
personnel denied him access to services.  Gamble brought a civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prison personnel subjected 
him to cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating his Eighth Amendment 
rights. The Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s 
serious injuries constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  The court 
concluded that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of 
prisoners constituted an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”115 
The Court stated that in this case however, there was not deliberate 
indifference because medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times 
within three months.116 
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court found that committed persons 
“possessed constitutionally protected liberty interests under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”117  In this case, a mentally retarded person who was 
involuntarily committed to a mental institution suffered many injuries 
because of his actions and the actions of other residents.118  The court 
explained that when a person is institutionalized there is a duty “to provide 
certain services and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its 
responsibilities.”119  The Court also said that the patient had a due process 
right to “reasonably safe conditions of confinement.”120  The Court 
reasoned that, “if it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted 
criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the 
                                                
113 See Carolina D. Watts, "Indifferent (Towards) Indifference:" Post-DeShaney 
Accountability for Social Services Agencies When A Child Is Injured or Killed Under 
Their Protective Watch, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 125, 133 (2002). 
114 See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104. 
115 Id. at 104 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
116 Id. at 106-08. 
117 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309. 
118 Id. at 309–12. 
119 Id. at 317. 
120 Id. at 307. 
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involuntarily committed — who may not be punished at all — in unsafe 
conditions.”121 
B. A Child’s Right to Safety: Pre-DeShaney 
In Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, a foster child 
filed a civil rights action against the New York Department of Social 
Services for failing to supervise her in her foster care placement.122 The 
court held that a defendant may be liable under Section 1983 if the agency 
knew of an injury, risk, or specific duty, and exhibited deliberate 
indifference. In addition, the failure to perform the duty or ameliorate the 
risk must have been the proximate cause of the deprivation of the plaintiff’s 
rights.123 
In Taylor v. Ledbetter, the court found that state actors must take 
affirmative action to “ensure the well being and promote the welfare of 
children in foster care.”124  When an official is charged with failing to 
exercise an affirmative duty, a Section 1983 action can arise if two 
requirements are satisfied.125  First, the failure to act must have been the 
substantial factor that led to the violation of the liberty or property 
interest.126  Second, the responsible official must have displayed deliberate 
indifference.127 The court relied on Youngberg and Estelle when it stated 
that the Fourteenth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”128  The 
court reasoned that society has been outraged at the mistreatment that 
defenseless children have faced, and acknowledged that “it is time that the 
law give to these defenseless children at least the same protection afforded 
adults who are imprisoned as a result of their own misdeeds.”129   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
121 Id. at 315–16. 
122 See Doe v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981). 
123 Id. at 145. 
124 Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 1987). 
125 Id. at 794. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 797 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
129 Id. 
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C. The Supreme Court Limits the Protection of Children: The 
DeShaney Case 
Joshua DeShaney lived with an abusive father who beat him often.130  
The Department of Social Services was aware of the abuse and took 
“various steps to protect him,” but it let him stay with his father.131  
Joshua’s father eventually beat him so severely that he suffered permanent 
brain damage, leaving him severely retarded.132  Joshua’s mother filed suit 
against the county and the Department of Social Services.133  The Supreme 
Court held that the state did not have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to 
protect a child who was not in its custody, but who had been with his 
parent the whole time.134  The Court did recognize, however, that “in 
certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposed upon the State 
affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular 
individuals.”135  
 Several Courts of Appeals have held that if States fail to protect foster 
children from mistreatment they may be liable under the Due Process 
Clause.136  In footnote nine, the Court stated, “had the State by the 
affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free society and 
placed him in a foster home by its agents, we might have a situation 
sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to 
an affirmative duty to protect.”137 
 
D. The Lower Courts’ Post-DeShaney Interpretations 
Lower courts generally interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in 
DeShaney to mean that while youth are in the foster care system, they have 
a substantive due process right to be free from harm.138  In Nicini v. Morra, 
Tony Nicini had been abused by his parents and had attempted suicide.139  
After his release from John F. Kennedy’s Crisis Center he went to live with 
                                                
130 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191–93 
(1989).  
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 201. 
135 Id. at 198. 
136 See Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000); Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d 851, 857 (Wash. 
2003). 
137 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191 n.9.  
138 Id. 
139 Nicini, 212 F.3d at 801. 
2014]     PROVIDING PROPER PREPARATION 23 
 
 
an unofficial foster family during which time he was under the supervision 
of the state.140  He subsequently ran away from the home alleging that the 
foster father, Edward Morra, had given him alcohol and drugs and had 
sexually assaulted him.  Investigation into the foster father’s past revealed 
that he had been previously convicted for corrupting a minor and for 
distributing controlled substances to a minor.141  Nicini filed suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983142 and state tort law against Frank Cyrus, the caseworker 
with the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Youth 
and Family Services.143   The court held that just as the state had an 
affirmative duty to provide for the needs of prisoners, it had the same duty 
to foster children because the situations are analogous.144  The court 
explained, “when the state places a child in state-regulated foster care, the 
state has entered into a special relationship with that child, which imposes 
upon it certain affirmative duties. The failure to perform such duties can 
give rise, under sufficiently culpable circumstances, to liability under 
section 1983.”145 
In Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, a civil rights action was 
filed on behalf of foster children who were allegedly abused while in foster 
care.146  The Sixth Circuit held “that due process extends the right to be free 
from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in state-regulated foster 
homes.”147  Several other courts recognize that right as well, including 
Taylor v. Ledbetter, a pre-DeShaney case.  In that case, a foster child filed 
suit against Georgia state and county officials for abuse suffered at the 
hands of a foster parent.148  Through her guardian, the child filed suit 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the state and county officials 
were grossly negligent and indifferent to her welfare.149  The court held that 
a child who had been placed in a foster home involuntarily was in a similar 
situation to a prisoner and a child locked up in a mental facility.150 Thus, 
                                                
140 Id. at 808–09. 
141 Id. at 804. 
142 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979) (codified 
as 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
143 212 F.3d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 2000). 
144 Id. at 808. 
145 Id.  
146 902 F.2d 474, (6th Cir. 1990). 
147 Id. at 476. 
148Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 792 (11th Cir. 1987). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
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the foster child could file suit under section 1983 for violation of her 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.151  
In Braam v. Washington, the Supreme Court of Washington held that 
upholding the due process rights of foster youth was in line with “the 
weight of authority among our sister courts.”152  Foster care is a form of 
state custody and foster care workers can be held liable for denying a foster 
youth his right to safety if the child is harmed because of the denial.153  The 
courts have found that the right exists and they are willing to hold state 
actors liable for violating that right.154  This is important in the protection 
of foster youth, but the rights of children who are not in custody are still in 
question.155   
 
PART V: CONFLICTING STANDARDS: “DELIBERATE 
INDIFFERENCE” OR “PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT” 
There are two competing standards that the courts use when determining 
the liability of state actors who fail to comply with their obligations to 
foster youth.  The standards originate from the Supreme Court cases Estelle 
v. Gamble and Youngberg v. Romeo.  The Estelle standard requires a 
stricter level of proof than the Youngberg standard although some courts 
have stated that the standards are so similar that either could apply in any 
situation.156  The result of these competing standards, and no Supreme 
Court ruling on the subject, is a circuit split regarding which standard of 
care applies to foster youth – the standard that applies to prisoners or the 
standard that applies to institutionalized mental patients.   
The Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebego County Department of 
Social Services found that the situation of foster youth is “sufficiently 
analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an 
affirmative duty to protect.”157 The duty to protect prisoners is governed by 
the standard known as “deliberate indifference”.  The duty of care for 
institutionalized mental patients is the “professional judgment” standard.  
The DeShaney Court, having decided that foster youth are in state custody, 
did not give clear guidance as to which standard of care applied: 
“deliberate indifference” or “professional judgment.”158 
                                                
151 Id. at 797. 
152 Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d 851, 857 (Wash. 2003). 
153 See Swift, supra note 12, at 1209. 
154 See Watts, supra note 110, at 140. 
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156 Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
157 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).  
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The standard that courts apply is critical because depending on which 
standard is applied, there could be no right for foster youth to live in safe 
conditions or to receive emancipation preparation services. On one hand, 
foster youth may have a minimal level of safety and treatment guaranteed 
by the Constitution if they reside in a circuit that finds that foster youth are 
more analogous to prisoners.  On the other hand, foster youth may have a 
higher level of safety and treatment guaranteed by the Constitution if they 
reside in a circuit that analogizes foster youth to institutionalized mental 
patients.  This conflict occurs because Estelle was an Eighth Amendment 
case about a prisoner who had to show that the state had the requisite mens 
rea of intent.159  If this standard is applied to foster youth, the court will 
require that the child show a highly culpable state of mind, which would 
lead to the provision of a very low level of protection for foster youth.  In 
contrast, the Youngberg court, when deciding a case about an 
institutionalized person, analyzed the case under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which set the state of mind requirement much lower.160  This 
created a much stronger duty for the protection of foster children. 
 
A. The Deliberate Indifference Standard: Estelle v. Gamble 
Deliberate indifference is the standard of liability under the Eighth 
Amendment for state actors exercising custody over prisoners under 
Section 1983.161 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court established the deliberate 
indifference standard for state actors who were responsible for attending to 
the medical needs of prisoners.162  The Court explained that deliberate 
indifference is manifested by intentional denial or delayed access to 
medical care or intentional interference with treatment.163  The Court also 
said that there is a right of action against prison doctors under Section 1983 
for deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury.164   In 
Doe, the Second Circuit found deliberate indifference on the part of the 
Bureau. 165  The court stated that the agency could be held liable under 
Section 1983 for failing to report suspected child abuse to authorities after 
being informed by school authorities.166  The court reasoned that liability 
could be based on an inference “from a pattern of omissions revealing 
                                                
159 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
160 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982). 
161 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987); 
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165 Doe v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 791 (2d Cir. 1983). 
166 Id. 
26 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 4:1 
 
deliberate inattention to specific duties imposed for the purpose of 
safeguarding plaintiffs from abuse.”167 
In Farmer v. Brennan, a transsexual prisoner brought a suit against 
prison officials for placing him in general population.168  The prisoner 
claimed that the officials showed “deliberate indifference,” by failing to 
keep him safe from other inmates.169  The Supreme Court relied on the 
opinion in Estelle and held that a prison official could not be held liable for 
placing a prisoner in general population unless the official knew of and 
disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”170  The Court 
concluded that, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and 
he must also draw the inference.”171  The Court further explained that the 
Eighth Amendment does not forbid cruel and unusual “conditions,” just 
cruel and unusual “punishments.”172  This high standard of proof allows for 
a significant amount of abuse when it comes to preventing harm in prisons.   
Many of the circuit courts that rely on Estelle for foster care issues set a 
similarly high standard of proof for state actors who are charged with 
caring for foster youth.173  For example, in Taylor, the deliberate 
indifference standard was applied to determine whether state actors could 
be liable for harm.174  The court stated that meeting the standard would be 
arduous.  The court explained that in order to successfully recover under 
Section 1983 from state actors, a foster child “will be faced with the 
difficult problem of showing actual knowledge of abuse or that agency 
personnel deliberately failed to learn what was occurring in the foster 
home.”175  Nonetheless, several circuit courts follow the standards laid out 
in Doe and Taylor when applying the deliberate indifference standard.176 
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168 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
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173 Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 810-11(3d Cir. 2000); Norfleet v. Ark. Dept. of 
Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 
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174 Taylor, 818 F.2d at 793. 
175 Id. at 796. 
176 Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 292; K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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B. The Professional Judgment Standard: Youngberg v. 
Romeo 
In Youngberg, the Court established that state actors who cared for 
mental health facility patients must exercise professional judgment.177  The 
Court distinguished patients in mental facilities from prisoners by stating, 
“persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more 
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” 178  The Court did not 
specify which actions were acceptable or unacceptable, but it did state that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment standard is lower 
than the “compelling” or “substantial” necessity tests.179  The Court applied 
a reasonableness test to determine whether the state actor exercised 
professional judgment and emphasized that, “courts must show deference 
to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional.”180   
The Court in Youngberg held valid a caseworker’s appropriate 
professional judgment, which meant that caseworkers are not responsible 
for decisions that may turn out poorly, just those where they did not 
exercise professional judgment.181 The Court added: 
 
In determining what is “reasonable”-in this and in any case 
presenting a claim for training by a State-we emphasize that courts 
must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified 
professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to 
conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary 
with the internal operations of these institutions should be 
minimized.182 
 
The Court here emphasized that judges are not the ones to determine the 
standards that should apply in the context of care.  Instead, the language 
                                                
177 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). 
178 Id. at 321-22. 
179 Id. at 322. See also Romeo, 644 F.2d at 175, vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) 
(explaining that the substantial necessity standard provides protection for 
institutionalized persons “from attack unless some substantial necessity justifies the 
lack of protection.”  The compelling necessity standard ensures that institutionalized 
residents are “left unrestrained unless some compelling necessity justifies their 
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disregard of patients' needs, on the other.”).  
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182 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322. 
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suggests that qualified professionals are to establish the required level of 
care.  A judge, according to Youngberg, can find that a worker failed to 
exercise professional judgment, the standards of which were set by the 
state.  In applying that standard, the act of conducting oneself poorly alone 
can be used as a determination of failure to use professional judgment. 183   
Although the standards are not explicit, the courts do provide some 
guidance.   
The courts subsequent to the Youngberg decision typically apply a four-
part test to determine whether the state actor failed to exercise professional 
judgment.  The plaintiff must show that: (1) the state actor failed to 
exercise professional judgment; (2) the state actor did not supervise to a 
reasonable degree; (3) the harm was reasonably foreseeable; and (4) there 
was a causal link between the injury and the failure to supervise.184 For 
example, in Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, the court held that the city 
worker who was responsible for supervising the foster youth did not 
exercise professional judgment when she failed to (1) visit the youth every 
six months; (2) monitor school performance; (3) read and evaluate 
psychiatric evaluations; and (4) maintain contact with the foster family.185  
 
C. Applying the Professional Judgment Standard to Foster Youth 
Youngberg established the substantive due process right of safety and 
freedom from bodily restraint for institutionalized mental patients.186  This 
right should be extended to foster youth. Foster youth have a right to 
treatment and safety and the circuit split regarding the current standards of 
care endangers them.  Foster youth who are preparing to emancipate from 
the system need training for adulthood in order to avoid harms such as 
homelessness, poverty, and incarceration.  The Supreme Court should 
resolve the circuit split so that the professional judgment standard will be 
applied consistently in the context of foster care.  
That standard can be applied to protect the constitutional rights of foster 
youth, while recognizing the interests of the state.  In keeping the interests 
of the state and foster youth in mind, foster youth have a constitutional 
right to adequate care and treatment.  State actors must determine the 
individual needs of the youth in their care and take appropriate action in 
response to those needs.  Once the state actors have taken actions they 
deem appropriate, those actions should be scrutinized to determine whether 
they are Constitutional.  State actors should be held liable if their conduct 
constitutes a substantial departure from the accepted guidelines of 
                                                
183 See Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F. Supp. 2d 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
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professional judgment.  The professional judgment standard clearly 
distinguishes between conduct that is acceptable and conduct that is in 
violation of minimum requirements of conduct.  This standard effectively 
balances the constitutional rights of foster youth against the state’s 
legitimate interests. 
 
D. Strengthening Youngberg: Foster Children Are Not Like Prisoners 
The plaintiff in Estelle v. Gamble was a prisoner in a state correctional 
facility;187 the plaintiff in Youngberg v. Romeo was a mentally retarded 
man committed to an institution by his mother who could no longer care for 
him.188   Both of these men were involuntarily committed to state custody, 
but Gamble voluntarily committed a criminal act and was sentenced to 
prison.189  Romeo was mentally retarded and had no control over himself or 
his actions; he had the mental acuity of an 18-month-old child.190 
Older children fall somewhere between the Gamble/Romeo spectrum as 
it concerns being responsible for their actions.  Parents, however, can 
overpower their children and subject them to situations that are beyond the 
child’s control.  For example, a parent can send a child to a foster home or 
an institution against the child’s will and there is nothing that the child can 
do to prevent the situation from occurring.  The child, then, is not 
responsible for the placement, nor can she be held responsible for her 
parent’s decision to hand her over to the state.  
Children are innocent and different from prisoners in several ways.  
First, a child is not responsible for a parent’s decision to commit her to 
foster care.  Second, if the parent committed the child to foster care because 
of the child’s behavioral problems, the child is still innocent because of her 
status as a child.  In addition, children are not held accountable for their 
actions in the same way that adults are.  Courts treat juvenile offenders 
much differently than adult offenders.191  The innocence of a child is 
similar to the innocence of the mentally retarded man in Youngberg who 
could not control his behavior.  The standard for judging children should 
account for “children's vulnerability and their needs for ‘concern, . . . 
sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.”192  State actors deemed responsible 
for the care of foster youth should be held to the professional judgment 
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standard laid out by the Youngberg court because children are more like the 
helpless man in Youngberg than the prisoner in Estelle.   
 
PART VI: PROTECTING CHILDREN VOLUNTARILY PLACED 
IN FOSTER CARE  
The connection between prisoners, mentally retarded patients, and foster 
care youth is that most of them were involuntarily placed in the state’s care.  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that unless a person is 
involuntarily placed in state care, he does not have a substantive due 
process right to safety.193  In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department 
of Social Services, Charles Milburn’s parents placed him in foster care 
when he was almost two years old.194  When it had been found that the 
foster care parents had abused Charles, the biological father filed suit.195  
The court relied on the facts in DeShaney and held that the foster parents 
were not state actors because the State had not removed the child and 
placed him in a foster home.  The parents had given him up voluntarily.196  
In Jordan v. Tennessee, the parents of a severely mentally retarded boy 
placed him in a residential facility.197  One evening, the boy wandered out 
of a propped-open door and fell into a pond on the grounds of the facility 
and drowned.198  The court held that without affirmative action by the state 
to restrict the liberty of an individual by involuntarily committing him to a 
mental institution, there is no constitutional duty to provide for the safety of 
that person.199  The district court in this case also maintained that DeShaney 
determined the outcome. 
It is particularly dangerous to distinguish between voluntarily and 
involuntarily placed foster children because there are many children who 
are placed into care by their parents.200  This voluntary/involuntary standard 
means a large population of foster children is not entitled to a right of 
safety in foster care settings.201  When a child is placed in state care it is not 
voluntary because the child is not choosing to be committed; the parent 
makes the decision.  In Youngberg, the mother of a mentally retarded man 
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Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 475. 
196 Id. at 476. 
197 Jordan, 738 F. Supp. at 260. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 260. 
200 See Ryan, supra note 13, at 301. 
201 Id. 
2014]     PROVIDING PROPER PREPARATION 31 
 
 
named Nicholas Romeo placed him in an institution.202  Romeo did not 
have control over his institutionalization, and neither did Charles Milburn 
have control over his commitment to the foster care system.203  The 
voluntariness standard in the foster care context means that a child could be 
placed in the system against his will, but if his parents committed him it 
would be considered voluntary in the law’s eyes.204 
There has been at least one federal appellate court that has seemingly 
rejected the voluntariness test when considering a foster child’s substantive 
due process right to safety.205  In Meador, the court noted that the parents 
had abandoned their three children who were subsequently placed in a 
foster care home by their grandfather.  While the girls were in the foster 
care home they were sexually abused.206  Without discussing the 
voluntariness standard, the Sixth Circuit held “that due process extends the 
right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in state-
regulated foster homes.”  This holding is sound because in application 
foster parents should be held to the same standard of care as biological 
parents and should provide a safe environment regardless of whether the 
child was placed voluntarily or involuntarily.207   
Many federal courts have adopted the view as well and look suspiciously 
at the voluntariness standard in the case of persons who have been admitted 
to state institutions.  Those courts assert that voluntarily placed individuals 
do not have a lesser right to safety than those who were involuntarily 
committed to mental institutions.  For example, in Kolpak v. Bell the court 
held that persons placed in a mental institution whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily were constitutionally entitled to safety.208  The court in Seide 
v. Prevost concluded that the voluntary/involuntary classification that 
would guarantee liberty interests to those committed to state institutions 
involuntarily, but would deny the same liberty to those who were 
voluntarily committed, would not withstand the strict scrutiny requirement 
of the equal protection clause.209  The court said that regardless of 
voluntary or involuntary commitment, the State may not deprive any 
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citizen of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution.”210 
There are definite distinctions between mentally retarded persons and 
foster children, but one federal court has embraced this view as it relates to 
foster care.  In Wilder v. City of New York, Mr. Wilder was a foster child 
and ward of the City.  The court asserted that although he was not 
committed to an institution involuntarily, he was unable to make certain 
decisions for himself and “could have looked only to the City to ensure that 
protection.”  The court stated, “[an] individual's liberty is not less worthy of 
protection merely because he has consented to be placed in a situation of 
confinement.”211  Although there are differences between mentally 
retarded adults and foster children, both classes should have 
constitutionally protected liberty interests regardless of the type of consent. 
Unless the Supreme Court recognizes that the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction presents dangers to due process, a significant number of foster 
children are at risk. Children who are removed from their parents’ custody 
by the state will be protected under the Due Process Clause, but those given 
up voluntarily will not. Some parents realize that they cannot effectively 
take care of their children and believe that the only way that they can 
improve their children’s life is to turn them over to the state. If parents 
know that their children are not protected from harm under the 
Constitution, they may keep them in an unsafe situation. Courts need to 
consider the effects of granting the constitutional right to safety to some 
and not others in state custodial care.   
Foster youth should have a substantive due process right to services 
whether they entered the system voluntarily or involuntarily. The Court in 
Braam words it nicely when it concludes that “at its core, foster children 
have a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable risk of 
harm, including a risk flowing from the lack of basic services, and a right 
to reasonable safety.”212 
 
PART VII: LITIGATION STRATEGIES  
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Right of Action 
Foster youth are relatively helpless because of their reliance on state 
appointed caregivers for protection. If a staff member or foster parent 
harms them, there is little they can do to remove themselves from the 
situation.  There are also no reliable legal remedies with which they can 
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seek relief. 213  Foster youth have filed state tort law actions and federal 
statutory claims under Section 1983, but these claims are largely 
unsuccessful.214  Federal claims under Section 1983 for a violation of a 
foster youth’s substantive due process rights have proven to be more 
successful for those who have suffered harm while in foster care.215 
 
 
1. History of the Civil Rights Act 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted in order to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment against “state or local officials who violated the 
‘rights, privileges, or immunities' of persons in the United States.”216  
Section 1 of the Act, which was later codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allows 
private citizens to file suit against state actors for violating their federal and 
Constitutional rights.217   Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is often used 
to hold public agencies and employees liable for harm caused to foster 
children in their care.218  The relevant part of the statute states: 
 
Every person who, under color of law of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage … subjects or 
causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.219 
 
2. Section 1983 for Substantive Due Process Violations  
Generally, state law and federal statutory claims are unsuccessful.  
However, foster youth can file claims concerning a violation of their 
                                                
213 Sharon Balmer, From Poverty to Abuse and Back Again: The Failure of the Legal 
and Social Services Communities to Protect Foster Children, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
935, 940 (2005). 
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constitutional rights under Section 1983.220  The statute serves to protect 
individuals from state infringement on their individual rights.221  The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: 
 
No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.222 
This Amendment was created so that people could assert Fourteenth 
Amendment claims against the government for violating their civil 
rights.223  The Fourteenth Amendment creates no new substantive due 
process rights, but people can recover if established rights have been 
violated.224  In order to bring a Section 1983 action, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant was a person (this includes state actors), and that the 
defendant’s act caused a person to be subjected to the “deprivation of any 
federally protected rights, privileges, or immunities.”225   
To overcome any defenses of qualified immunity that the government 
may put forth, the plaintiff must show that the constitutional right was 
clearly established when the event occurred.226  With the number of foster 
youth who are harmed in the foster care system, the courts must establish a 
consistent, workable standard for their care. This new standard should 
address the youth’s needs and state actors must be held accountable if they 
fail to live up to the standard. 
 
B. Class Action Lawsuits Under the Social Security Act 
One of the most common litigation strategies for large groups of foster 
youth is the class action. In Palmer v. Cuomo, foster children in New York, 
some of whom had emancipated from the foster care system and were 
living independently as well as some who were homeless, brought an 
action to enjoin the city and state to provide adequate pre-discharge 
preparatory plans and to properly supervise the children who had 
emancipated to independent living.227  The Supreme Court, Appellate 
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Division, held that the city had a statutory duty to perform its pre-discharge 
preparatory obligations and its post-discharge supervisory 
responsibilities.228  The court concluded that the City of New York is 
required to provide independent living skills training prior to discharging 
the children.229  The court asserted that the city had the responsibility to 
“ensure training related to career objectives, including obtaining 
marketable skills or trades, career counseling, and assistance in enrolling in 
employment programs . . . until the child is discharged.”230  The court 
found that there was no indication that the foster children received the 
required training and assistance.231 
The many complexities of foster care litigation are highlighted in G.L. v. 
Zumwalt.  In that case, foster children in Missouri brought an action against 
the defendants for violating their right to be free from harm, which is 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IV of the Social 
Security Act.232  The Jackson County Office of the Missouri Division of 
Family Services denied that it violated the children’s rights.233  The district 
court approved a consent decree entered into by the parties that provided 
that foster children would be guaranteed to receive essential services to 
treat psychological, emotional and intellectual problems.234  The decree 
also guaranteed to each child a permanency plan, which would determine 
whether the child would reunite with her parents, get adopted, or 
emancipate.235  The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees in the amount of $40,000, but the parties agreed to withdraw 
the plaintiff’s claims for damages.236   
The court in Wolfe v. New Mexico Department of Human Services also 
approved a consent degree requiring the Department and its top officials to 
fulfill certain requirements.237  In that case, children in state custody filed 
suit against the New Mexico Department of Human Services and other 
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state officials for failing to develop permanency plans.238  The Department 
moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim and filed a motion for 
summary judgment.239  The court approved a consent decree and noted that 
a violation of liberty interests could be analyzed under due process.240  The 
court said liberty denotes freedom from bodily restraint, the right to enter 
into a contract, to right to engage in an occupation, to acquire knowledge, 
to marry, to establish a home and raise children, to worship God as you 
please, and to enjoy recognized privileges.241   
The liberty interests must have been created by a specific state or federal 
law, or be implicit in the Constitution. The court concluded that the 
plaintiffs could obtain relief for violations of Title IV and XX of the Social 
Security Act, and that the plaintiffs could also recover monetary relief for 
denial of their civil rights from the “defendants in their individual 
capacities.”242  The court noted, however, that under the Eleventh 
Amendment, the Department and the officials in their official capacities 
were immune from suit to the extent that the complaint stated a claim for 
money damages.243  The consent decree was issued, detailing a plan to 
restructure the foster care system in New Mexico.244  This case opened 
many doors to foster youth, and provided them with future opportunities 
for successful litigation. 
 
C. Common Law Tort Claims 
Common law tort claims are commonly advanced by foster youth against 
foster care agencies when attempting to recover for abuse and neglect while 
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242 Id.  at 353 (holding plaintiffs were denied rights guaranteed by Titles IV and XX 
of the Social Security Act and granting plaintiffs’ claims against natural defendants in 
their individual capacities).  
243 Id. at 353 (barring claims for money damages against the Department and natural 
defendants in their official capacities).  
244 Id.  at 354 (“The Secretary of the New Mexico Human Services Department has 
acknowledged that children in the custody of the Human Services Department have 
rights fair, reasonable, and timely decision-making with regard to access to adoption, 
and to fair, reasonable and adequate procedures and practices necessary to insure 
access to permanent adoptive homes. . . .”).  
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in the state’s custody.  The claim is usually directed against the agency or 
an employee of the agency under the principle of vicarious liability.245  The 
common law tort claim is negligence, which is asserted for the purposes of 
recovering from the agency.  The elements of negligence, such that a cause 
of action may be stated are duty, breach, causation, and harm.246 
 A cause of action based on negligence asserts that the agency has “a 
duty, or obligation recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform 
to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risks.”247  The duty that the foster care agency has is in the 
form of parens patriae248 because the agency has taken on the 
responsibility of caring for the foster child in situations where the child’s 
natural parent cannot or will not. 
Establishing that the agency breached a duty is more difficult.  The 
plaintiff must show that the person failed to conform to a required 
standard.249  In order to prove causation, the plaintiff must show that there 
was a “reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the 
resulting injury.”250  This is commonly known as “proximate cause,” and is 
also comprised of causation in fact.251  Finally, the plaintiff must show that 
there was “actual loss or damage.”252  If actual loss or damage cannot be 
shown, damages will not be awarded.253 
Proving all of these elements is difficult and can significantly limit the 
number of actions brought against foster care agencies.  Governmental 
immunity may also make a claim difficult because it can completely bar the 
tort claim.254  In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (In re Terrell R.), 
the court explained that the social workers were immune to the lawsuits 
                                                
245 Vicarious liability means that as a result of some relationship between A and B, 
the negligence of A will be charged against B even though B played no part in it or 
encouraged it.  B may have even done everything he could to prevent the negligence.  
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 69 (5th ed. 1984).  In the foster 
care context A would be the employee and B the foster care agency.  If the employee 
(A) commits a tort against a foster child, the agency (B) would be held liable.  
246 Id. at § 30 (describing the elements of a negligence claim). 
247 Id. at § 30 (describing the duty element of a negligence claim). 
248 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (explaining that state 
actors are supposed to exercise parental care over children in their custody). 
249 See Keeton, supra note 243, § 30 (describing the breach element of a negligence 
claim). 
250 Id. at § 30 (describing the causation element of a negligence claim). 
251 Id. at § 30 (explaining causation includes proximate cause and cause-in-fact). 
252 Id. at § 30 (describing the harm element of a negligence claim). 
253 Id. at § 30 (explaining where no loss has occurred, damages cannot be recovered 
in a negligence claim). 
254 Id.  
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brought by the foster children who were injured while in foster care.255  The 
court reasoned that the social worker did not have a mandatory duty to 
supervise and the foster care statute was designed to preserve families, not 
to prevent abuse.256 
Several courts have held that when state actors place a child in foster 
care they are entitled to governmental immunity even if the placement is 
done negligently, because the act of making serious personal judgments 
constitutes a discretionary act.257  In Brantley v. Department of Human 
Resources, biological parents of a two-year-old who drowned while in 
foster care brought a negligence action against the Department of Human 
Resources.   The State agreed to waive its sovereign immunity under the 
Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA) subject to the discretionary function 
exception.  Under this function, the state is not liable for “[t]he exercise or 
performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not 
the discretion involved is abused.”258  
The court held that deciding to leave a two-year-old unattended in a 
swimming pool was an insufficient basis on which to invoke the exception.  
The court reasoned that the decision to leave the child unattended was not 
the type of governmental decision that should be protected from judicial 
review.  This case highlights the fact that not all state actors are immune 
from actions brought by youth in their care.  New York’s Court of Appeals 
follows this standard as well, and allows foster youth to plead common law 
                                                
255 Cnty. of L.A. v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637, 640 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding social workers immune from lawsuits by foster children injured during their 
time in foster care). 
256 Id. at 646 (“This legislative preference for placement in the home of a relative is 
merely a legislative goal or policy that must be implemented by the County in the 
exercise of its judgment as to an appropriate foster care placement; it does not create a 
mandatory duty . . . In addition, the purpose of the statute is to preserve the family 
relationship, not to prevent sexual abuse.”) 
257 E.g., Jackson v. Dep't of Human Res., 497 S.E.2d 58, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding that a public officer who places a child in foster care is entitled to 
governmental immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act because he is “exercising 
discretion in the performance of his official duties”); Gloria G. v. State Dep't of Soc. 
Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 987-88 (Kan. 1992) (holding that the complex judgments 
made by the government and its agents “rank high on the continuum of discretion and 
should not be subject to hindsight scrutiny by courts”); Williams v. Horton, 437 
N.W.2d 18, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a caseworker had immunity under 
the Michigan Tort Claims Act because the placement was discretionary because it 
required a high degree of personal judgment). 
258 Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-24(2) (West 2013). The GTCA defines a “discretionary 
function or duty” as “a function or duty requiring a state officer or employee to 
exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of action 
based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors.” 
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tort negligence claims against child welfare officials without being barred 
by governmental immunity.259   Not all states, however, waive tort 
immunity, so a foster youth’s ability to assert a tort claim will depend on 
where she lives. 
Tort claims are asserted for foster children based on actions of abuse or 
neglect.  This theory will likely prove inadequate in litigation for foster 
youth who want to bring an action for a failure to receive services to 
prepare them for adulthood.  It will be extremely difficult to prove that the 
failure to provide the services was the proximate cause of the harm suffered 
after the youth left foster care.  The foster youth will have to prove that the 
cause of his or her homelessness, incarceration, unemployment, or low 
educational achievement was due to the state failing to provide services to 
prepare him or her for emancipation. 
A dangerous road lies ahead for foster youth who are not adequately 
prepared by the state actors responsible for protecting them from harm, and 
it requires legal action.  The case law establishes that foster youth have a 
constitutional right to treatment and safety while they are in state custody.  
Foster youth can file: (1) a civil rights claim under Section 1983 for a 
substantive due process violation, (2) a class action lawsuit under the 
Social Security Act, or (3) a common law tort claim, if they do not receive 
proper emancipation preparation training and aftercare services. 260  To 
strengthen their case, plaintiffs could show that there are former foster 
youth who are destitute as a result of state actors who failed to properly 
prepare them for independent living.261  In addition, plaintiffs could 
strengthen their case by proving that previous foster children suffered harm 
                                                
259 Mark G. v. Sabol, 717 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (N.Y. 1999) (“Section 419’s legislative 
history . . . reveals that it was intended to provide immunity only with respect to civil or 
criminal liability that would otherwise result from acts taken by persons, officials, or 
institutions in a good faith effort to comply with specific provisions of the Social 
Services Law . . . There is no indication that section 419 was intended to apply to 
failures to provide services required by the Social Services Law.”). 
260 Palmer, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 21 (granting plaintiffs preliminary injunction enjoining 
defendants from discharging plaintiffs from foster care until (1) a discharge plan had 
been adopted for plaintiffs pursuant to Social Service Law; (2) plaintiffs were given 
reasonable preparation for discharge including career counseling, training in a 
marketable trade, and skills for independent living; and (3) plaintiffs were given 
reasonable notice of their discharge, directing defendants to provide supervision of 
each plaintiff until he is 21 years old, ensuring plaintiffs’ basic needs are met, including 
appropriate housing outside of the New York City municipal shelter system).  
261 Id. at 21-22 (showing seven foster children discharged prior to the age of 21, 
without adequate preparation for independent living and given no opportunity to 
contest the discharge led to their destitution).  
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because state actors failed to contact them for supervisory meetings after 
discharge.262  
 
PART VIII: RECOMMENDATIONS 
Youth who emancipate from the foster care system are less likely to have 
a high school diploma, go to college or vocational school, or make enough 
money to support themselves.263   After leaving the foster care system, 
many foster youth flounder.  A recent study conducted by Fostering 
Careers, found that nearly half of former foster youth in their twenties were 
unemployed at any given time.264  This makes it more likely that they will 
become homeless, dependent on welfare, or incarcerated.265   
The courts realize that they have a duty to prepare foster youth in state 
custody for emancipation, and have ruled in favor of foster youth to help 
ensure that they are adequately prepared for emancipation.  There are five 
recommended steps that would assist the state actors in fulfilling their duty 
to foster youth, thus providing adequate emancipation preparation.  These 
recommendations are achievable and will work to improve the foster care 
system so that it can more effectively support foster youth’s career goals 
and personal development. 
 
A. Independent Living Programs  
States should create programs that are aimed to (1) provide referrals to 
service agencies; (2) develop interventions for foster youth; (3) provide 
professional development services to staff members; and (4) build 
partnerships with employers.266  The programs would work to serve a 
distinct population of disconnected youth.267  New York City has two 
programs that provide for the needs of foster youth: The Academy and the 
                                                
262 Id. at 22 (showing inadequacies, such as failure to contact or offer assistance or 
supervision following discharge from foster care led to foster children’s’ destitution).  
263 Alice Bussiere, Jennifer Pokempner & Jennifer Troia, Adolescents, the Foster 
Care System, and the Transition to Adulthood: What Legal Aid Lawyers Need to Know, 
39 Clearinghouse Rev. J. of Poverty L. & Pol'y 159, 159 (July-Aug. 2005) (discussing 
the challenges faced by youth who emancipate from foster care). 
264 Tom Hilliard, Foster Youth and the Workforce: Next Steps, Center for an Urban 
Future 1, 3 (2013), http://nycfuture.org/pdf/Foster_Youth_and_the_Workforce.pdf 
(stating foster youths’ unemployment is a key reason for their poor adult outcomes). 
265 Id. at 3 (stating foster youths’ unemployment makes them more likely to succumb 
to homelessness, welfare dependence, or incarceration).  
266 See Hilliard, supra note 262, at 4 (discussing the City of New York’s 
responsibility to provide adequate programs to prepare foster youth for employment 
after they are discharged).  
267 Id. at 4 (stating New York City’s Office of Youth Development should not limit 
itself to serving foster youth, but should serve a designated population rather than the 
broad population of disconnected youth).  
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Next Generation Center have developed strategies to help foster youth who 
face employment barriers.268  The programs are not identical, but they both 
provide a variety of services for foster youth that will help bridge any gaps 
they may have in their approach to adulthood.269  
 
B. Collect Data and Report Outcomes 
In formulating a plan to evaluate programs, assess costs, and target 
resources for foster youth, data collection is essential.270  There are two 
methods of data collection that can be useful: point-in-time data, which is 
collected annually; and administrative data, which is collected regularly by 
different organizations and then aggregated into a system.271  This data can 
be used to measure former foster youth’s performance after emancipation, 
and to ensure that the proper tools are being implemented.272  The results 
generated by the reports can be used to build support for plans to provide 
more efficient resources for foster youth.273  Progress can be measured by 
identifying goals, collecting data, and monitoring progress.274  If leaders in 
the community can see the outcomes, they will be better able to make 
informed decisions about whether to invest in a program.275 Without this 
type of data, it will be hard to determine which services are effective and 
which need improvement. 
 
C. Independent Living Committees 
 Life after emancipation for foster youth can be frightening especially if 
the youth have no support systems.  The formation of an independent living 
committee, a group of people who work together to aid foster youth in their 
                                                
268 Id. at 5 (citing the Academy and The Next Generation Center as New York City’s 
most promising breakthrough in serving high-needs foster youth). 
269 Id. at 5 (providing services including education, preparation for work, and job 
search). 
270 Mary Cunningham, Sharon McDonald & Norm Suchar, Homelessness In 
America, Volume 3: Solutions to Homelessness, 10 (Robert Hartmann McNamara eds., 
2008) (stating careful examination of data can lead to shifts in how communities 
respond to homelessness). 
271  Id. at 10-11 (discussing the different, but complementary methods communities 
use to collect data). 
272 Id. at 11 (describing how communities use collected data to develop plans for 
ending homelessness).  
273 Id. (stating results generated by data collection build support for plans enacted to 
end homelessness).  
274 Id. (“Promising communities are able to demonstrate progress because they 
identify performance measures, collect data, and continually monitor progress.”) 
275 Id. (tracking outcomes allows leaders to make informed decisions regarding 
continued investment in new strategies or exploration of other interventions). 
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transition to adulthood, could help youth if the members work to build 
awareness among the foster youth and the community about independent 
living services.276  KidsVoice is a Pennsylvania legal services organization 
that has developed a model program.  It represents about 5,000 foster teens 
each year, helping them with their transition to independent living.277 There 
are three components to this program: education and training, a special teen 
unit that provides advocacy for individuals, and a resource fair that 
promotes awareness among foster teens and service providers.278 
 KidsVoice provides training for advocates, which includes client 
interviews, an overview of the relevant law, statistics about youth who age 
out, and suggestions for improved advocacy.279   Members of independent 
living committees train kids on how to advocate strategically regarding 
housing, mental health, medical coverage, education, employment, 
community resources, living skills, and permanent networks.280  KidsVoice 
also created a special teen advocacy unit that helps teens by: (1) visiting 
them in an environment that is convenient for them; (2) negotiating for 
resources for them; (3) preparing them for court; and (4) counseling them 
about available services.281  
 
D. Post-Secondary Educational Assistance 
 States are obligated to provide foster youth with proper preparation for 
emancipation.  That should include the implementation of a program to 
offer financial assistance for educational pursuits.  States could determine 
how the funding would be implemented, but should provide tuition and fee 
waivers for wards of the court.282  In addition, living expense subsidies 
should be provided for full-time students.  The waivers should cover youth 
until the age of twenty-four, to give some leeway for foster youth who were 
                                                
276 See Hollander, supra note 18, at 447 (describing the services and resources 
provided by an Independent Living Committee in Pennsylvania). 
277 Id. at 444 (recognizing KidsVoice as an organization that works to help foster 
youth who age out of the system to successfully transition to adulthood). 
278 Id. at 447 (describing the components of the Independent Living Committee 
program used to assist foster youth). 
279 Id. (training for KidsVoice staff designed to assist staff in advocating for teen 
clients both in and out of court).  
280 Id. at 447-48 (targeting areas of concern in advocating for clients approaching 
their eighteenth birthday). 
281 Id. at 448 (advocating for almost 200 teen clients in one of the most economically 
disadvantaged areas of Allegheny County, the Monongahela Valley). 
282 See Benedetto, supra note 27, at 407 (explaining states that do not currently offer 
an education assistance program should consider implementing such a program 
adopting certain aspects of the Massachusetts model).   
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not able to gain access to college immediately after high school.283  Foster 
youth could contribute to their education by paying for a portion of the 
tuition, the funding of which could be obtained if the youth participates in 
work-study.284  As the former foster youth gains valuable education, she 
will be better able to maintain economic stability, which will decrease 
government costs.  
 
E. Employer Partnerships and Subsidies 
 Finding employment is particularly difficult for foster youth because 
they do not have job experience or interviewing skills.  To help, 
caseworkers can form a partnership with employment agencies in order to 
gather information regarding job openings. The employment agency could 
communicate with specific employers and provide incentives for hiring 
foster youth in the form of employment subsidies. 285 The subsidies would 
work by providing a monetary benefit to employers for hiring foster 
youth.286   
 Opponents of this suggestion argue that foster youth may grow to 
depend on the subsidies and have a difficult time finding work on their 
own. In order to prevent this from occurring, the subsidies could be 
provided on a limited basis. The subsidies will not only provide foster 
youth with a “foot in the door,” but they will also send a message to the 
public that it is important to involve foster youth in the workforce. 
 
PART IX: CONCLUSION 
Foster youth in state custody have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive 
due process right to treatment and a right to be free from harm, which 
includes the provision of pre-emancipation preparation and after care 
services.   The right to treatment and safety should be expressed in the form 
of training, which should include access to support systems and educational 
and employment opportunities. Foster youth should have these rights 
regardless of whether they are in the state’s custody voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  In addition, foster youth are not like prisoners and should 
not be treated as such.  The courts should apply the professional judgment 
                                                
283 Id. at 407 (describing important aspects of a Former Foster Youth Education 
Assistance Program). 
284 Id. at 408 (explaining the importance of work-study in a Former Foster Youth 
Education Assistance Program because it places former foster youth students on equal 
footing with their fellow students and allows former foster youth to obtain work 
experience and professional contacts). 
285 See Benedetto, supra note 56, at 422. 
286 See id. 
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standard rather than the deliberate indifference standard when determining 
liability of state actors who have failed in their obligations to care for the 
needs of the youth they serve. Furthermore, the Supreme Court should 
clearly establish these rights and standards so they are specific to foster 
youth. 
The high rates of unemployment, low educational achievement, poverty, 
and criminal activity that pervade the lives of foster youth after they age 
out of foster care are often caused by a lack of preparation for 
emancipation, which the state is obligated to provide.  The failure to 
provide these services causes harm, and while the harm does not 
necessarily manifest while the youth is in foster care, it exhibits once the 
youth has left the system.  Failing to provide foster youth with the 
necessary skills for independent living creates lasting harm, and it is 
imperative that the courts work to prevent the harm by requiring that state 
actors provide emancipation preparation training for foster youth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
